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Abstract For many years the research community has
attempted to model the Internet in order to better un-
derstand its behaviour and improve its performance.
Since much of the structural complexity of the Inter-
net is due to its multilevel operation, the Internet’s
multilevel nature is an important and non-trivial fea-
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ture that researchers must consider when developing
appropriate models. In this paper, we compare the nor-
malised Laplacian spectra of physical- and logical-level
topologies of four commercial ISP and two research net-
works against the US freeway topology, and show an-
alytically that physical level communication networks
are structurally similar to the US freeway topology.
We also generate synthetic Gabriel graphs of physical
topologies and show that while these synthetic topolo-
gies capture the grid-like structure of actual topologies,
they are more expensive than the actual physical level
topologies based on a network cost model. Moreover,
we introduce a distinction between geographic graphs
that include degree-2 nodes needed to capture the ge-
ographic paths along which physical links follow, and
structural graphs that eliminate these degree-2 nodes
and capture only the interconnection properties of the
physical graph and its multilevel relationship to logical
graph overlays. Furthermore, we develop a multilevel
graph evaluation framework and analyse the resilience
of single and multilevel graphs using the flow robust-
ness metric. We then confirm that dynamic routing
performed over the lower levels helps to improve the
performance of a higher level service, and that adap-
tive challenges more severely impact the performance
of the higher levels than non-adaptive challenges.
Keywords Internet modelling, critical infrastructure,
attack · graph spectrum, flow robustness, algebraic
connectivity, spectral radius · network science,
Gabriel graph, geographic graph, structural graph,
multilevel graph, network cost · resilience, survivability,
dependability, performability
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1 Introduction and Motivation
The Internet has evolved to become a multilevel in-
frastructure critical to the functioning of society. The
multilevel behaviour emerged in part due to the fact
that protocols interact in multiple levels and in part
because of the ways in which players operate, provide,
and use the services of the Internet. Over the years,
studies by the research community investigating the
resilience of the Internet have suggested controversial
findings [56], one being that an attack on a few central
nodes could bring the entire Internet down. But this
claim was dismissed by other researchers [11,29] based
on the mesh-like structure of actual service-provider
backbones. Therefore, realistic models are required to
mathematically understand the properties of the Inter-
net and improve its resilience.
The Internet can be examined at the physical, IP,
router, PoP (point of presence), and AS (autonomous
system) level from a topological point of view [28]. At
the bottom is the physical topology consisting of ele-
ments such as fibre and copper cables, point-to-point
wireless links, ADMs (add drop multiplexers), cross-
connects, and layer-2 switches. The logical level con-
sists of devices operating at the IP-layer. A PoP is a
collection of routers in a geographic location, and PoP-
level topology can be seen as an aggregated view of
the routers. At the AS-level, different provider networks
peer with each other at IXPs (Internet exchange points)
and private peering points [52]. Understanding the evo-
lution of the Internet from a multilevel point of view
is more realistic than examining its properties at indi-
vidual levels. On the other hand, the primary focus of
previous studies has been on the logical aspects of the
topology, since tools have been developed to collect,
measure, and analyse IP-level properties of the Inter-
net (e.g. Rocketfuel [57]). However, given that physical
networks provide the means of connecting nodes in the
higher levels, the study of physical connectivity is an
important area of research [30,37,44]. Furthermore, it
is essential to model the impact of large-scale disasters
and attacks against the physical infrastructure using
the physical-level graph [21]. There are only a few stud-
ies that analyse graphs holistically from a multilevel
point of view [45,46,51], but in very specific contexts.
In this paper, we begin our multilevel analysis of
communication and transportation networks by expand-
ing upon our previous work. First, we analyse the nor-
malised Laplacian spectra of several commercial and re-
search networks and find that fibre topologies are struc-
turally similar to other critical infrastructures such as
freeways. In our earlier work, we show this by exam-
ining only two commercial networks [19], in this study
we expand this to six networks. Second, we show that
physical level topologies can be modelled by Gabriel
graphs [34], since both are grid-like structures. Third,
while Gabriel graphs capture the structure of the phys-
ical topologies, they are more expensive than the actual
physical level topologies based on a network cost model.
Fourth, we show that properties of geographic physi-
cal networks that capture information on the paths fol-
lowed by links are dominated by degree-2 nodes. The
removal of these degree-2 nodes does not change the
structure significantly, but these structural graphs pro-
vide a more accurate representation of graph-theoretic
properties such as degree distribution and clustering
coefficient. Fifth, we develop a formal multilevel graph
model and a framework to analyse flow robustness of
a multilevel graph [22]. Furthermore, we extend this to
include multiprovider graphs that captures logical IXP
links. We analyse the flow robustness of a number of
two-level graphs constructed from real-world commu-
nication networks and show that resilience of networks
can be captured more realistically than a single level
graph. Finally, as a side benefit of our work, we pro-
vide online adjacency matrices of these networks to the
research community for future studies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The
communication and transportation topologies we use
in this study are presented in Section 2. The evalua-
tion of graphs using metrics is presented in Section 3.
The correlation of transportation and communication
networks using graph spectra is presented in Section 4.
The structural properties of communication networks,
as well as Gabriel graph models of physical networks
is presented in Section 5. We evaluate multilevel trans-
portation and communication graphs using flow robust-
ness in Section 6. We analyse graphs and rank their re-
silience using flow robustness and spectral properties in
Section 7. We provide a brief discussion in Section 8,
followed by our conclusion as well as proposed future
work in Section 9.
2 Topological Dataset
We study real networks (i.e. transportation and com-
munication) that are geographically located within the
continental United States. Therefore, we only include
the 48 contiguous US states, the District of Columbia,
and exclude Hawaii, Alaska, and other US territories.
Furthermore, we have developed the KU-TopView (KU
Topology Map Viewer) [59] using the Google Map API
and JavaScript to visually present and assist in analy-
sis of these topological maps. Unlike other visualisation
tools, KU-TopView makes raw data conveniently avail-
able in the universal form of an adjacency matrix along
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(a) US freeways (b) AT&T (c) Level 3
(d) Sprint (e) TeliaSonera (f) Internet2
Fig. 1 Visual representation of transportation, and physical and logical level service provider networks in KU-TopView [10]
with the node coordinates and permits their manipu-
lation. We have made these topologies publicly avail-
able [10].
2.1 Transportation Network
We have generated the freeway topology to represent
the transportation network. Our starting point is the
American Association of State Highway and Transporta-
tion Officials (AASHTO) data, which lists control cities
and their sequential listing along each interstate high-
way. A control city is a major population center or des-
tination on or near the interstate highway system de-
termined by each state [13]. However, while generating
the transportation topology, we realised that the exist-
ing list of control cities was not sufficient to represent
the graph accurately. For example, there is no control
city at some interchanges between interstate highways.
Therefore, we add 6 additional cities1 in those cases
after verifying the crossing on Google Maps, as well
as two that are needed to correspond to physical fiber
junctions2. There are also a few important newer free-
ways that are not listed in the 2001 AASHTO document
that we add to reflect current connectivity3. This US
freeway graph with 411 nodes, 553 links, and an aver-
age degree of 2.7 is shown in Figure 8a. We note that
in a previous study of US interstate highway system,
1 Benton Harbor MI, Country Club Hills IL, Effingham IL,
Gary IN, Joilet IL, Lake Egypt IL
2 Blaine WA, Hannibal MO
3 I-335 Kansas Turnpike, I-86 East, I-97, I-68, I-495 in NY,
and the important non-Interstate US-101 in California be-
tween Los Angeles and San Francisco
the authors used GIS (geographic information system)
databases from the year 2000 (unfortunately there is no
reference to the source of data), and the resulting inter-
state freeway network consisted of 1337 links and 935
nodes with an average degree of 2.86 [35]. We note that
the number of nodes and degree distribution in this
geographic graph is highly dependent on the number
of control cities used for geographic representation and
that a number of cities are degree-2 vertices in between
higher degree nodes at interchanges. We will discuss a
uniform solution to this problem in Section 5.
2.2 Communication Networks
The Internet is a complex and large-scale network for
which collective analysis is non-trivial. Therefore, we
restrict this study to include physical fibre and logical
level topologies. We note that throughout this paper
we refer to IP router, PoP, and AS level graphs as logi-
cal level graphs or L3, whereas fibre level topologies as
physical level topologies and denote them as L1. We use
Rocketfuel-inferred AT&T, Level 3, and Sprint PoP-
level topologies [9,57] to study logical level topologies.
We note that international links, as well as links cross-
ing over Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, are removed inten-
tionally to compare the logical level topologies against
the US fibre deployments and freeway topologies.
We then use a US long-haul fibre-optic routes map
data to generate physical topologies for AT&T, Sprint,
and Level 34 [43]. In this map, US fibre-optic routes
4 We also utilised the Level 3 network map in an effort to
reflect the data as accurately as possible [4].
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Table 1 Topological characteristics of baseline networks
Topology Star Lin. Tree Ring Grid Tor. Mesh Star Lin. Tree Ring Grid Tor. Mesh
Nodes 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Links 9 9 9 10 13 15 45 99 99 99 100 180 200 4950
Max. degree 9 2 3 2 3 3 9 99 2 3 2 4 4 99
Avg. degree 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2.6 3 9 2 2 2 2 3.6 4 99
Deg. assort. −1 −0.1 −0.5 1 0.3 1 1 −1 0 −0.3 1 0.6 1 1
Closeness 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 1 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 1
Clust. coeff. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Algeb. con. 1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 1.4 10 1 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 100
Diameter 2 9 5 5 5 3 1 2 99 12 50 18 10 1
Radius 1 5 3 5 3 3 1 1 50 6 50 10 10 1
Hopcount 1.8 3.7 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.9 1 2 33.7 7.8 25.3 6.7 5 1
Max. Node
36 20 26 8 11 4 0 4851 2450 3068 1201 616 200 0
betweenness
Max. Link
9 25 24 13 12 6 1 99 2500 2496 1250 341 200 1
betweenness
cross cities throughout the US and each ISP has a dif-
ferent coloured link. We project the cities to be physical
node locations and connect them based on the map,
which is sufficiently accurate on a national scale. We
use this data to generate adjacency matrices for each
individual ISP. To capture the geographic properties
as well as the graph connectivity, cities are included
as nodes even if they are merely a location along a
link between fibre interconnection. As with the free-
way graph, we will further discuss this in Section 5.
Finally, we also make use of the publicly available Telia-
Sonera5 network [6], Internet2 [3], and CORONET [8,
25] topologies. CORONET is a synthetic fibre topology
designed to be representative of service provider fibre
deployments, and this does not have a corresponding
logical topology.
The physical and logical commercial service provider
networks are shown in Figures 8b, 8c, 8d, and 8e. The
Internet2 research network at the physical and logical
level is shown in Figure 8f. Initial visual inspection sug-
gests that the physical topologies are similar to the free-
way topology. The relation of the physical level topol-
ogy and other physical infrastructures has been stated
before [59,62]; however, to best of our knowledge, we
are not aware of any previous work that quantitatively
demonstrates the correlation between these different in-
frastructures rigorously.
3 Properties of Networks
Although topology viewing is a powerful tool, it does
not suffice for rigorous analysis of topologies [65]. We
therefore calculate the graph metrics of regular net-
works (shown in Table 1) and critical infrastructures
5 TeliaSonera physical graph has a link between Houston
and Miami that appears to cross over the Gulf of Mexico.
This is because TeliaSonera does not provide intermediate
geographic path information.
as shown in Table 2 using the Python NetworkX li-
brary [38].
3.1 Graph Metrics
Some of the well-known metrics provide insight on a va-
riety of graph properties, including distance, degree of
connectivity, and centrality. Network diameter, radius,
and average hop count provide distance measures [37].
Eccentricity of a node is the longest shortest path from
this node to every other node; the largest value of eccen-
tricity among all nodes is the diameter and the smallest
eccentricity is the radius. Betweenness is the number
of shortest paths through a node or link and provides
a centrality or importantness measure [49]. Clustering
coefficient is a centrality measure of how well a node’s
neighbours are connected [37]. Closeness centrality is
the inverse of the sum of shortest paths from a node
to every other node [54,55]. Assortativity provides a
measure of degree variance in a network [53]. Algebraic
connectivity, a(G), is the second smallest eigenvalue of
the Laplacian matrix [33]. For the graphs of the same
order (number of vertices), algebraic connectivity pro-
vides a very good measure of how well the graph is con-
nected and it indicates robustness of networks against
node and link failures [40,42,48].
3.2 Graph Properties
Based on the metrics we describe above, we analyse
regular graphs and real networks in this section.
3.2.1 Baseline Networks
We start our metrics-based analysis on seven regular
graphs: star, linear, binary tree6, ring, grid, toroid, and
6 We note that not all leaves are binary as needed for a
given order.
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Max. Node Max. Link
Degree Coeff. Hop. Between. Between.
AT&T L1 383 488 2.6 0 39 20 14.1 0.1 17011 14466
AT&T L3 107 140 2.6 0.1 6 3 3.4 0.3 2168 661
Level 3 L1 99 130 2.6 0.1 19 10 7.7 0.1 1628 1046
Level 3 L3 38 376 19.8 0.8 3 2 1.5 0.7 59 37
Sprint L1 264 312 2.4 0 37 19 14.8 0.1 11275 9570
Sprint L3 28 76 5.4 0.4 4 2 2.2 0.5 100 27
TeliaSonera L1 21 25 2.4 0.2 9 6 4.1 0.3 75 61
TeliaSonera L3 16 29 3.6 0.5 4 2 2.1 0.5 34 17
Internet2 L1 57 65 2.3 0 14 8 6.7 0.2 630 521
Internet2 L3 9 13 2.9 0.4 4 2 2 0.5 9 11
CORONET L1 75 99 2.6 0 17 9 6.45 0.2 1090 704
US freeways 411 553 2.7 0.1 42 21 13.65 0.1 23872 19785
full mesh. We investigate the effect of an increase in
the order (number of nodes) from n = 10 to n = 100
for the baseline topologies as shown in Table 1. We
note that the values are rounded to the nearest tenth
decimal. The number of edges (links) are increased as
necessary for each topology to scale to the number of
nodes. Some metrics yield the same values for graphs
of the same order (e.g. average degree for star, linear,
tree), and others yield the same values for graphs of
differing sizes and orders (e.g. same a(G) for 10 node
linear and 100 node grid), therefore relying on a single
metric for graph analysis is clearly not sufficient.
3.2.2 Real Networks
We investigate the graph-theoretic properties of the log-
ical and the physical topologies of four commercial ISP
networks (AT&T, Level 3, Sprint, TeliaSonera) and the
Internet2 research network, as well as the fibre-link level
of the CORONET synthetic topology. We also study
the US Interstate Highway graph. Our results are shown
in Table 2. In general, the metrics for the logical topolo-
gies differ from the physical topologies in that the phys-
ical topologies have more nodes and links compared to
logical topologies.
The maximum degree of each provider’s physical
topology is less than that of its corresponding logical
topology. This is due to the ability of logical topologies
to arbitrarily overlay virtual links. The average degree
of each provider’s physical topology is less than that of
its corresponding logical topology, in particular for the
Level 3 topology in which the average degree for the
logical level graph is a relatively highly meshed 19.8.
Physical topologies have a higher value of network di-
ameter, radii, and average hopcount than that of logical
topologies. Betweenness values also differ for physical
and logical topologies, showing a difference of one or
two orders of magnitude higher for physical topologies.
Clustering coefficient and closeness centrality metrics
are also higher for the logical topologies compared to
physical topologies.
From a distance metrics perspective, clearly physi-
cal topologies have higher values. We observe that the
values of degree-based metrics also differ between phys-
ical and logical topologies. This can be attributed to
the ease with which nodes can be connected in a log-
ical topology as compared to the difficulty involved in
connecting node in a physical topology, in which one
must physically lay down fibre between nodes. Long
links are added to logical topologies to reduce the for-
warding overhead of multihop paths. From a centrality
metrics perspective, we can see that physical topologies
are not as clustered and have more homogeneous degree
distributions.
We can also see that US freeway graph metrics are
closer to those of the physical topologies. This is not
surprising: both the US Interstate Highway system and
the physical level of the Internet are physical infrastruc-
tures rather than logical overlays, and they frequently
share the same paths since freeways (and railways) pro-
vide inexpensive right-of-way along which to lay fibre.
Collective analysis of graph metrics provides a good in-
dication of resilience of different topologies; however, it
is difficult to infer sensible conclusions about the struc-
ture of a network or how similar two different networks
are. Therefore, we redirect our attention to the spectra
of these graphs.
4 Spectrum of Networks
In this section we first present a brief background on the
spectra of graphs and then present our spectral analysis
of the transportation and physical topologies.
4.1 Background on Spectra
Let G = (V,E) be an unweighted, undirected graph
with n vertices and m edges. Let V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1}
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denote the vertex set and E = {e0, e1, . . . , em−1} de-
note the edge set. A graph can be represented by several
methods including an adjacency matrix, incidence ma-
trix, Laplacian matrix, and normalised Laplacian ma-
trix [24,63]. A(G) is the symmetric adjacency matrix
with no self-loops where aii = 0, aij = aji = 1 if there
is a link between {vi,vj}, and aij = aji = 0 if there
is no link between {vi,vj}. The Laplacian matrix of G
is: L(G) = D(G) − A(G) where D(G) is the diagonal
matrix of node degrees, dii = deg(vi). Given degree of
a node is di = d(vi), the normalised Laplacian matrix
L(G) can be represented:
L(G)(i, j) =

1, if i = j and di 6= 0
− 1√
didj
, if vi and vj are adjacent
0, otherwise
Let M be a symmetric matrix of order n and I be
the identity matrix of order n. Then, eigenvalues (λ)
and the eigenvector (x) of M satisfy Mx = λx for
x 6= 0. In other words, eigenvalues are the roots of the
characteristic polynomial, det(M − λI) = 0. The set
of eigenvalues {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn} together with their mul-
tiplicities (number of occurrences of an eigenvalue λi)
define the spectrum of M . Spectral graph theory has
been extensively covered in several monographs [15,17,
24,26,63]. The spectrum of the AS-level topology of the
Internet has been analysed based on the k largest val-
ues of the adjacency matrix [36]. The IP-level topology
of the Internet has also been investigated and its Lapla-
cian spectrum compared against synthetically gener-
ated topologies [41]. The normalised Laplacian spec-
trum of AS-level topologies has been shown to differ sig-
nificantly from that of synthetically generated topolo-
gies [64]. Recently, a weighted spectral distribution met-
ric has been proposed and has shown that synthetically
generated graphs can be fine-tuned using spectral prop-
erties [32]. While previous studies utilised graph spectra
to analyse logical level topologies, in this study we fo-
cus on physical networks and how they relate to each
other structurally, as well as to their logical overlays.
4.2 Spectral Analysis of Networks
The normalised Laplacian spectrum provides insight
into the structure of networks that are different in or-
der (number of nodes) and size (number of links). The
eigenvalues of the L(G) reside in the [0, 2] interval and
take values {0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λn}. The algebraic
multiplicity of λ = 0 indicates the number of connected
components. Hence, there is always at least one eigen-
value equal to 0. Furthermore, matrices which resemble
one another may have similar eigenvalues and multiplic-
ity. The spectrum of L(G) is quasi-symmetric7 around
1, which means a large algebraic multiplicity for the
eigenvalue λ = 1 may indicate duplications in a net-
work [14]. In other words, two separate nodes {u, v}
might have all or some of their neighbours being same.
For example in a star graph with all other nodes con-
necting to the single central node, the leaves will all
have the same neighbour, which is the central node.
Likewise, while in a full mesh all nodes have the same
neighbours, a partial mesh will have partial duplica-
tions. The presence of many small eigenvalue multi-
plicities may indicate that there are many components
within a graph and these components are loosely con-
nected to each other [14]. An eigenvalue of 2 indicates
the graph is bipartite; eigenvalues close to 2 indicates
the graph is nearly bipartite [14]. A bipartite graph
is a graph in which its vertex set can be divided into
two groups in such a way that there will be no edges
between the vertices within each group. Once the dis-
crete and deterministic eigenvalues are calculated for a
given graph, the relative frequency of eigenvalues yield
valuable information about the structure of a network.
Moreover, spectra can be presented in relative cumu-
lative frequency as well, and we describe our choice in
the next section. For the rest of this paper we abbre-
viate relative frequency as RF and relative cumulative
frequency as RCF.
4.2.1 Spectra of Baseline Networks
The RF (relative frequency) of the normalised Lapla-
cian eigenvalues for baseline topologies (star, linear,
ring, tree, grid, toroid, full mesh) of order n = 100 is
shown in Figure 2. Since most of the eigenvalues have
very small multiplicities, the RF of eigenvalues has a
floor that is too noisy to be able to gather useful in-
formation. Because of the noisy floor in representing
multiple RFs, we use the RCF (relative cumulative fre-
quency) for the baseline graph analysis and for the rest
of the paper. Furthermore, we note that while some re-
searchers use RFs that they term density of eigenvalues
to represent the spectra [14] and others use RCF that
they term normalised index of eigenvalues to represent
the spectra [64]. Since we show multiple curves in a plot
to compare different graphs, our preference is to show
spectra using RCFs since it is more informative.
The RCFs of the eigenvalues for these baseline to-
pologies are shown in Figure 3. The star topology has
7 We use the term quasi-symmetric to represent almost
symmetric graph spectra. For example, a finite full-mesh
graph is quasi-symmetric, since all eigenvalues except the first
(which is equal to 0) are equal to a value close to 1. We will
detail those graphs in the next section.
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Fig. 4 Spectra of complete graphs
its eigenvalues fixed, independent of the graph order:
{0 = λ1 ≤ 1 = λ2 = . . . = λn−1 ≤ λn = 2}. The spec-
trum of a 100 node full mesh looks similar to a star,
except that it does not have an eigenvalue of 2 and the
eigenvalues are fixed at 1.0101 (we comment on that
later). An interesting observation is that the spectrum
of these two baseline topologies look very similar. In-
deed, at a micro level we can think of each individual
node in a mesh as a star motif. Furthermore, the al-
gebraic connectivity of a star is 1 [33]. However, since
node centrality measures are largest for a star topol-
ogy, the central node in a star can be the target of an
attack or the single point of failure from a network engi-
neering perspective. An attack against the root node of
a binary tree is also the worst case scenario, however,
this partitions the network into two islands, in which
nodes in each island can communicate with each other
whereas this is impossible for a star topology. The spec-
trum of linear and ring topologies look almost identical,
since a ring has an additional link compared to a lin-
ear topology, and both linear and ring topologies have
the lowest algebraic connectivity values. Likewise, mul-
tiplicities of grid and toroid topologies look very sim-
ilar, since a toroid has additional links to connect the
nodes on the edge of a grid. We also observe that since
a Manhattan grid is a combination of linear topologies,
its spectrum looks similar to a linear topology. Multi-
plicities of a tree topology lie somewhere between the
two extremes of mesh and linear.
We show the spectra of five different full-mesh com-
plete graphs in Figure 4. The eigenvalues of a n-order
complete graph are: {0 = λ1 ≤ nn−1 = λ2 = . . . = λn}.
The multiplicity of the eigenvalue equal to n/(n−1) for
complete graphs is n− 1. Moreover, as the order of the
graph approaches infinity, the eigenvalues will converge
to a value of 1 since limn→∞
n
n−1 = 1. However, eigen-
values λ2 through λn are never exactly equal to 1 in
a finite full mesh topology. Furthermore, the algebraic
connectivity is equal to the order of a complete graph
a(G) = n.
4.2.2 Spectra of Real Networks
We plot the RCFs of eigenvalues of US freeways against
physical8 and logical level topologies in Figure 5 and
Figure 6 respectively. Clearly, the spectra of the logical
and physical topologies differ. Furthermore, the spectra
of the physical topologies resemble the spectra of the US
Interstate Highway graph as shown in Figure 5. This
confirms our supposition that the properties of net-
works are similar since fibre is laid along right-of-ways,
such as freeways. The spectra of logical level topologies
along with the US Interstate Highway graph is shown
in Figure 6. We intentionally include the transportation
graph to compare it against the logical level topologies,
which clearly shows the spectra do not match to that of
freeways. The algebraic multiplicity for the eigenvalue
8 These plots use the geographic version of the physical
graphs; this will be explained in Section 5.
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λ = 1 is largest for the AT&T logical topology, indi-
cating that this topology contains the largest number
of node duplications. In other words, this topology has
the most star-like components, as is evident by visually
inspecting it on KU-TopView [10]. The largest eigen-
values indicate to what degree a graph is bipartite [14].
The largest eigenvalues of the physical topologies and
the largest eigenvalues of the freeways graph are the
eigenvalues closest to 2. Hence, the physical topologies
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Fig. 6 Spectra of logical networks
5 Structure of Communication Networks
In Section 4 we showed that the transportation graph
closely matches the physical level topologies. In this
section we analyse the structure of individual service
provider networks and develop different models to rep-
resent physical level topologies. Furthermore, we calcu-
late the fibre length of the physical level topologies.
5.1 Gabriel Graphs
In an attempt to understand the analytical models of
physical level networks, we generate Gabriel graphs of
the six service provider networks we study. The Gabriel
graphs are useful in modelling graphs with geographic
connectivity that resemble grids [34,50]. In a Gabriel
graph, two nodes are connected directly if and only
if there are no other nodes that fall inside the circle
whose diameter is given by the line segment joining
the two nodes. Since physical level communication net-
works resemble grids, we generate Gabriel graphs using
the physical level network node locations. We note that
the physical node locations we use in KU-TopView are
in GPS (Global Positioning System) format, and we
therefore convert node locations from GPS to ECEF
(earth-centered, earth-fixed) format to accurately cal-
culate the distance between any nodes. The number
of nodes, links, and average degree of Gabriel graphs
of six geographical physical networks (Gabriel-G) are
shown in Table 3. In all cases, the synthetically gener-
ated Gabriel graph has more links than the correspond-
ing geographical physical level topology. Note that since
we use the same node locations, the number of nodes
remain the same for Gabriel graphs.
5.2 Structural Graphs
As discussed in Section 3, the geographical physical-
level topologies consist of degree two intermediate nodes
for accurate geographic representation. This is neces-
sary to model area-based challenges on the network,
such as power failures and severe weather [20,21]. How-
ever, these intermediate nodes artificially change the
graph theoretic properties of the networks, in particu-
lar artificially skewing the degree distribution toward
degree-2 nodes. Therefore, we modify the existing geo-
graphical physical level graphs by removing nodes with
a degree of two, as long as there is not a logical level
node at that location for which the physical node pro-
vides service to upper layers.
We show an example to emphasise the difference
in representing geographic and structural physical level
graphs in Figure 7. In this case, the map we have [43]
has a path from Spokane, WA (dark coloured pin on
upper left corner of Figure 7) to Billings, MT (cyan
coloured pin on lower right corner of Figure 7) crossing
five cities (Coeur d’Alene, ID; Thompson Falls, MT;
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Table 3 Structural properties of fibre topologies
Provider Graph Nodes Links
Avg. Tot. Link Avg. Link Max. Link Min. Link
Degree Length [km] Length [km] Length [km] Length [km]
AT&T
Geographical 383 488 2.6 50,026 103 630 6
Structural 130 191 2.9 37,489 196 1, 195 6
Gabriel-G 383 686 3.6 66,157 96 563 6
Gabriel-S 130 218 3.4 36,459 167 695 6
Level 3
Geographical 99 130 2.6 28,538 220 1, 063 10
Structural 48 71 3.0 25,390 358 1, 322 10
Gabriel-G 99 170 3.4 33,991 200 736 10
Gabriel-S 48 70 2.9 19,154 274 963 10
Sprint
Geographical 264 312 2.4 33,627 108 602 6
Structural 52 73 2.8 25,190 345 1, 299 11
Gabriel-G 264 474 3.6 57,104 121 605 6
Gabriel-S 52 73 2.8 19,853 272 1, 064 11
TeliaSonera
Geographical 21 25 2.4 14,190 568 1, 592 27
Structural 18 21 2.3 14,040 669 1, 592 41
Gabriel-G 21 26 2.5 12,111 467 1, 523 27
Gabriel-S 18 23 2.6 12,482 543 1, 523 41
Internet2
Geographical 57 65 2.3 19,050 293 910 41
Structural 16 24 3.0 18,146 756 2, 737 264
Gabriel-G 57 94 3.3 28,786 306 871 41
Gabriel-S 16 23 2.9 13,815 601 1, 063 264
CORONET
Geographical 75 99 2.6 28,325 286 943 20
Structural 39 63 3.2 27,579 438 1, 195 44
Gabriel-G 75 127 3.4 33,265 262 758 20
Gabriel-S 39 61 3.1 22,757 373 1, 064 44
Missoula, MT; Helena, MT; Bozeman, MT), forming
a zigzag shaped path that captures geography of the
path. This geographic physical graph is necessary to
accurately study area-based challenges such as severe
weather. On the other hand, this physical path from
Spokane, WA to Billings, MT can be represented as
a single link structurally. After all, it does not mat-
ter where the link is cut between Spokane, WA and
Billings, MT since there is no logical PoP that is a traf-
fic source or sink between these cities. We note that, the
nodes that have a degree 3 or higher are kept to capture
the physical layer structure even if there is not a log-
ical PoP in these locations. Moreover, stub nodes are
removed since we are interested in backbone networks
and in the geographic representation these stub nodes
might as well represent access networks. In this study,
we primarily focus on node failures, and therefore we
utilise structural physical level graphs.
Fig. 7 Geographical vs. structural graphs
The number of nodes, links, and average degree of
these structural graphs are shown in Table 3. Each
structural graph has fewer nodes and links than its
corresponding physical level graph. However, with the
exception of TeliaSonera, each structural graph has a
larger average degree than its corresponding physical
level graph. For example, the structural graph of In-
ternet2 has 16 nodes, 24 links, and an average degree
of 3 whereas the original Internet2 physical graph has
57 nodes, 65 links, and an average degree of 2.28. We
believe that the structural graph of TeliaSonera has a
smaller average degree than the original graph of Telia-
Sonera due to the latter’s small order and size. Fur-
thermore, the TeliaSonera geographic graph was not
obtained from the fiber map with significant detail of
intermediate cities, but rather from a far more abstract
map on TeliaSonera’s Web site with only a few interme-
diate degree-2 nodes. However, we note that total fibre
length of the structural graph (14,040 km) is close to
that of the original physical graph (14,190 km).
Finally, we also generate synthetic Gabriel graphs
using the node locations of the modified structural to-
pologies. The number of nodes, links, average degree
of nodes, and the total link length for these graphs
(Gabriel-S) are shown in Table 3. An observation is
that all these Gabriel graphs result in a total link length
that is less than structural graphs. On the other hand,
when we generate the Gabriel graphs of the geographi-
cal physical topologies, with the exception of TeliaSon-
era, these incur more cost than the geographical phys-
ical level topologies.
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Fig. 8 Spectra of service provider networks
5.3 Spectral Comparison of Networks
Next, we study the spectra of logical level, physical
level, Gabriel, and structural graphs as shown in Fig-
ure 8. We note that the CORONET synthetic topology
does not include any logical level topology since CORO-
NET is aimed at modelling a generic fibre topology.
We observe that physical level, Gabriel, and structural
graphs all share a similar spectrum due to the fact that
all of them have a grid-like structure. The normalised
Laplacian spectra of AT&T, Level 3, and Sprint log-
ical level networks show an s-curve that corresponds
to spectra of star- and mesh-like topologies (cf. Fig-
ure 3). On the other hand, the spectra of the TeliaSon-
era and Internet2 logical level topologies show a flat-
diagonal curve that corresponds much more closely to
spectra of grid-like topologies, as shown in Figure 1.
Note that Internet2 is a research network that has a
sparsely connected topology that is very similar to its
physical topology.
We conclude that the logical and physical level to-
pologies do indeed have different structures. The struc-
tural differences between the logical and physical level
topologies, while impossible to determine using a sin-
gle graph metric, are successfully captured by the nor-
malised Laplacian spectrum. Moreover, the normalised
Laplacian spectrum can be used to compare graphs of
differing sizes and orders. Furthermore, while the spec-
tra of the physical level topologies reveal grid-like struc-
tures, the spectra of the large logical level topologies
reveal star- or mesh-like structures.
5.4 Cost of Networks
Structural properties impact the connectivity and cost
of building networks. While at the logical level the cost
is captured by the number of nodes and the capacity of
each node (i.e. bandwidth and number of ports avail-
able in a router [11,29]), at the physical level, the length
of the fibre dominates the cost. As we discussed, log-
ical level links are arbitrarily overlaid links on top of
the underlying physical links. Previously, we provided
a network cost model as:
Ci,j = f + v × di,j (1)
where f is the fixed cost associated with link (includ-
ing termination), v is the variable cost per unit distance
for the link, and di,j is the length of a link [39,58,59].
Based on the assumption that the variable cost domi-
nates in long haul fibre networks, we ignore the fixed





where li is the length of the i-th link [12,18]. With this
simplified network cost model, we observe in Table 3
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that, with the exception of TeliaSonera, each Gabriel
graph incurs a cost that is approximately 20% larger
than its corresponding original physical level graph.
The Gabriel graph corresponding to TeliaSonera incurs
a cost that is actually 15% smaller than that of its cor-
responding physical level graph. The structural topolo-
gies incur a slightly smaller cost than the geographical
topologies because links are line-of-sight rather than
following the geographic path of the actual fibre. We
note that the number of nodes has changed from the
original geographical physical to the modified struc-
tural graphs, since we only consider degree-3 and logical
PoP nodes when constructing the structural graphs and
delete degree-2 intermediate nodes needed for accurate
geographic representation.
Table 4 Upper bounds of fibre link lengths for full mesh
Physical
Nodes Links
Tot. l Max. l Min. l
Networks ×106 [km] [km] [km]
AT&T 383 73, 153 116.8 4,400 6
Level 3 99 4, 851 7.5 4,260 10
Sprint 264 34, 716 57.8 4,330 6
TeliaSonera 21 210 0.4 4,079 27
Internet2 57 1, 596 2.7 4,233 41
CORONET 75 2, 775 4.6 4,260 20
Finally, for each physical level topology, we con-
sider a baseline of the full-mesh topology whose ver-
tex set is identical to that of the original topology. We
then calculate the maximum link length, minimum link
length, and total link length of each full-mesh topology
as shown in Table 4. The maximum possible length of
a fibre link is around 4,200 km for each topology corre-
sponding to a diagonal of the continental US. Note that
the total lengths are given in millions of km for a hypo-
thetical full-mesh physical level topology, emphasising
that real networks cannot have unlimited resilience due
to cost constraints.
6 Multilevel Analysis
A holistic graph analysis of the Internet is non-trivial
and does not exist to the best of our knowledge. Un-
derstanding the evolution of the Internet from a multi-
level point of view is more realistic than examining its
properties at individual levels. Therefore, we have de-
veloped a framework to analyse the flow robustness [54]
of multilevel and multiprovider networks. When design-
ing a resilient network, our main goal is providing ser-
vice to the users in a cost-efficient manner. Hence, it
is extremely important that we ensure connectivity be-
tween pairs of end systems. It is for this reason that
we introduced the flow robustness metric, which quan-
tifies resilience as the fraction of node pairs that remain
connected in a network after it has been subjected to
a number of node and link failures. Furthermore, we
categorise networks in the following four groups:
1. Single level, single provider: These networks con-
sist of the physical or logical level of a single provider.
Most previous studies analysed this type of graph [19,
21,54].
2. Single level, multiprovider: These networks con-
sist of AS-level graphs that include several provider
networks, but as a single adjacency matrix in which
each provider is a single vertex of the graph. While
several studies exist in the analysis of AS-level graphs
[31], they treat multiprovider graphs at an abstract
level (i.e. AS number), but they lack capturing the
inter-AS level connectivity into the structure of the
provider graphs.
3. Multilevel, single provider: These networks con-
sist of multilevel graphs within a single provider.
There are a few studies examining multilevel graphs
for a single provider [45,46,51].
4. Multilevel, multiprovider: This type of model
and analysis is the most realistic to capture the com-
plexity of the Internet, and is the ultimate target of
our research.
We begin our multilevel analysis of flow robustness
of a 3-level graph and a 2-level graph in which the top
two level graphs are the same. We show that the two
multilevel graphs exhibit different performance and us-
ing fewer levels of graphs obscures accurate resilience
evaluation of the top level of a multilevel graph. We
then analyse the flow robustness of a number of two-
level graphs constructed from real-world communica-
tion networks. Next, we analyse a multiprovider graph,
which is constructed by aggregating four different ISP
networks into a single adjacency matrix. Our results
confirm that it is difficult to partition the tier-1 ISP
connectivity using attacks targetted at logical links.
6.1 Multilevel Graph Model
In an effort to further understand the structure of a
number of communication networks, we employ a frame-
work for studying multilevel graphs. A multilevel graph
G is a sequence of graphs, G = (G`0 , G`1 , ..., G`L−1),
ordered from lowest-level graph to highest-level graph
where:
1. L is the number of levels
2. G`i is the graph corresponding to level `i, where `i
can be any desired label, given by G`i = (V`i , E`i)

































(c) Partitioned multilevel network
Fig. 9 Multilevel graph example
3. For all non-negative integers i and j such that i ≤ j,
V`j ⊆ V`i
4. For all non-negative integers i and j such that i ≤ j
and all nodes u and v such that u, v ∈ V`j , if
conn`i(u, v) = false, then conn`j (u, v) = false, where
the function conn`m takes as its two parameters
nodes in V`m and returns true if the two nodes are
connected in G`m and false otherwise.
In other words, a multilevel graph consists of multiple
graphs, one for each level, arranged such that for any
pair of levels, the set of all nodes in the higher level
is a subset of the set of all nodes in the lower level,
and such that nodes that are not connected in a lower
level are not connected in a higher level. In this paper,
we only consider unweighted and undirected graphs. A
connected multilevel graph is depicted in Figure 9a, and
when a link is removed at the bottom level, this does
not impact the higher level graphs if dynamic routing is
utilised as shown in Figure 9b. Note that in Figure 9c,
the removal of links (1, 6) and (3, 4) in the lowest level
partitions the graph and necessitates the removal of all
links between the disconnected clusters in the above
levels as well.
A number of authors have discussed the importance
of multilevel graphs as a means of further studying the
resilience and survivability of the Internet [27,45–47,51,
61]. Some have even developed multilevel graph frame-
works of their own [45,46]. One study made use of a
multilevel framework in order to study railway, peer-
to-peer, brain, and random graph topologies [46]. Each
topology was subjected to random and loaded [45] link
deletions, which were used to simulate errors and at-
tacks, respectively. The robustness of each topology was
then quantified in two different ways: as the fraction
of logical link weight remaining and as the size of the
largest connected component, both as a function of the
number of link deletions. In our work, we study chal-
lenges [23] on multilevel networks by subjecting topolo-
gies to deletions drawn from a far more extensive group
of graph metrics. Moreover, rather than treating robust-
ness as the fraction of remaining logical link weight or
as the size of the largest connected component, we con-
sider the quantity flow robustness, which is defined as
the fraction of node pairs that remained connected after
a number of deletions [54].
We implement our model in Python. Our code takes
as input a collection of adjacency matrices – one for
each level – and stores them in a single multilevel graph
data structure in memory, with the following require-
ments:
1. For any pair of levels, the set of all nodes in the level
above are required to be a subset of the set of all
nodes in the level below.
2. For any pair of levels, nodes that are disconnected
from one another in the level below are also required
to be disconnected from one another in the level
above.
If the above requirements are met, we can then perform
node and link deletions at any level and calculate any
number of graph metrics with the help of the Python
NetworkX library [38]. When node and link deletions
are performed within a given level, the effects of the
deletion are propagated to the higher levels to ensure
that requirement 2 remains satisfied.
6.2 Multilevel Graph Analysis
We first employ our multilevel graph analysis frame-
work to demonstrate the effect using multiple levels of
graphs on the service resilience [60] at the top level.
For this demonstrative analysis, we use a 3-level graph
(US freeways, geographical physical, and logical-level
topology of Internet2 research network) and a 2-level
graph (physical- and logical-level topology of Internet2
research network) in which top two levels are identical
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both for 3-level and 2-level graphs. We emphasise that
the lowest graph in the 3-level graph is the freeways
graph, and it does not provide a service in the con-
ventional sense to the physical topology other than the
provision of right-of-way. This is an example to show
the impact of using multiple levels of graphs on eval-
uating the service resilience of the top level. For both
the 3- and 2-level network, we perform random node
and link deletions at the lowest level and observe how
these deletions affect the highest level. Moreover, we
consider the effects of these deletions under two sep-
arate scenarios – dynamic routing and static routing.
Under perfect dynamic routing, we allow any pair of
nodes in a given level to remain connected so long as
there exists some path between them in the level be-
low. Under static routing, which we show for worst-case
baseline comparison, we immediately sever the connec-
tion between two nodes within a given level the moment
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Fig. 11 Robustness of multilevel network for link deletions
The results of this experiment are shown in Fig-
ure 10 for node deletions and in Figure 11 for link dele-
tions. For both networks, the average flow robustness
of the topmost level is plotted against the number of
random deletions performed at the lowest level. For a
given number of deletions, the average flow robustness
was computed by averaging the flow robustness over
1000 failure sets, each of which was generated by per-
forming the specified number of random deletions. For
each value of average flow robustness on the curve, we
also plot the 95% confidence interval. We note that the
3-level network has higher values of average flow ro-
bustness for any given number of deletions than the
2-level network. For example in Figure 10, when we
delete 50 random nodes in the lowest topology of the
3-level graph (in the freeways graph), the flow robust-
ness at the top level is approximately 0.55, whereas in
a 2-level graph when we delete random 50 nodes in the
lowest topology (in the physical topology), the flow ro-
bustness at the top level is approximately 0. This shows
that adding multiple levels of graphs in resilience anal-
ysis impacts the outcome significantly. The difference
when considering multiple levels is due to the fact that
the bottom level graph has nodes that are a superset
of the top 2 levels. We also note that if the US freeway
topology was less connected (e.g. instead of a grid-like,
it was linear) then the flow robustness would be lower.
However, it is outside scope of this paper to analyse
different connected graphs at the lower layers, and it
will be part of our future work. Moreover, both the
3-level and 2-level network have higher values of aver-
age flow robustness under dynamic routing than under
static routing. Finally as expected, average flow robust-
ness diminishes more severely with node deletions than
with link deletions since a single node deletion results
in the deletion of all of its incident links.
Our framework can handle graphs with any number
of levels. Part of the reason behind the experiment given
above was to demonstrate the ability of our framework
to handle multilevel graphs with more than two levels,
in particular, the 3-level graph with the Internet2 phys-
ical and logical topologies in the two upper levels and
the freeway right-of-way graph in the lowest level. We
focus on 2-level communication networks for the rest of
our multilevel analysis. To that end, we use the geo-
graphical physical and logical level adjacency matrices
for each of AT&T, Level 3, Sprint, TeliaSonera, and
Internet2 to create multilevel graphs for each network,
and then perform node and link deletions within each
multilevel graph at the physical level. Finally, we calcu-
late the resulting flow robustness in the logical level for
every failure set. The results of the experiments involv-
ing node deletions are shown in Figures 12 through 16,
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Fig. 16 Internet2 flow robustness for dynamic and static routing during adaptive and non-adaptive node deletions
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while the results of link deletions are shown in Fig-
ures 17 through 21.
As can be seen in Figures 12 through 21, in some
of cases we delete nodes and links at random while
in others we delete nodes and links with very specific
properties. The former experiments serve as a baseline
for comparison against the latter, which focus on those
nodes and links with large values of certain forms of
centrality – in particular, betweenness, closeness, de-
gree, link betweenness, current-flow betweenness, and
current-flow closeness. We discussed the first four met-
rics earlier in the paper; here, we define current-flow
betweenness and current-flow closeness [16].
Unlike conventional betweenness and closeness that
measure a node’s centrality based on the shortest paths
going through that node, current-flow betweenness and
current-flow closeness are both ways of measuring a
node’s centrality based on information flow alone. To
understand these two measures, we must first view the
graph under consideration as an electrical network into
which one unit of current enters from a node known
as the source and from which one unit of current exits
through another node known as the sink9. The loca-
tions of the source and sink suffice to specify a unique
current for each link in the network, as argued in Lemma
1 of [16]. Moreover, once each link is assigned a cur-
rent, it is possible to assign absolute potentials to each
node throughout the network, as argued in Lemma 2
of [16]10.
The current-flow betweenness of a node in a graph is
simply the average of the total current passing through
that node (from all of its incident links) over all pos-
sible electrical networks resulting from different possi-
ble (source, sink) pairs. The current-flow closeness of a
node in a graph is the inverse of the average over all
other possible nodes of the potential difference between
that node when it is treated as the source and the other
node when it is treated as the sink. If we view “current”
as information, then in essence, current-flow between-
ness is a measure of the amount of information that can
pass through a given node, while current-flow closeness
is a measure of the ease with which information can be
sent out from one node into the rest of the network.
9 Note that the concept of an electrical network – and there-
fore the measures of current-flow closeness and current-flow
betweenness – make sense only if the graph is simple and con-
nected. That is why these measures, along with closeness, are
employed only for non-adaptive deletions, explained in the
subsequent paragraph.
10 In order to compute these potentials, we assign each link
one unit of resistance. In other words, we employ the stan-
dard practice of assigning each link of an unweighted graph
a length of one. This provides the ability to capture the link
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Fig. 21 Internet2 flow robustness for link deletions
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We use all of these measures (betweenness, close-
ness, degree, link betweenness, current-flow between-
ness, and current-flow closeness) as a means to study
what sorts of deletions at the physical level have the
most disruptive effect at the logical level. Furthermore,
we consider two different categories of deletions: adap-
tive deletions and non-adaptive deletions. A non-adap-
tive deletion is defined as a deletion performed based on
the initial node or link centrality rankings that existed
prior to the occurrence of any deletion. An adaptive
deletion is defined as a deletion performed based on
centrality rankings that are recomputed after the most
recent deletion. This can result from an attacker that
has real-time access to internal network management
and operations information.
Finally, note that for centrality-based deletions we
compute flow robustness, while for random deletions
we compute average flow robustness in the same man-
ner as before, that is by averaging the flow robustness
over 1000 failure sets, each of which was generated by
performing the number of random deletions. We also
plot the 95% confidence intervals on each of the points
located on the random curves.
As before, flow robustness diminishes more severely
under static routing than under dynamic routing, and
node deletions have a greater impact on flow robust-
ness than link deletions. Furthermore, adaptive dele-
tions have a more severe impact on the network than
non-adaptive deletions. The reason for this should be
clear: an adaptive deletion is always selecting from the
pool of existing nodes or links the one with the highest
centrality value, whereas a non-adaptive deletion will
select from the pool of one that used to – but may no
longer – have the highest centrality value. Hence, adap-
tive deletions have a far greater tendency to select the
most important nodes or links than non-adaptive dele-
tions, which results in a more severe impact on the flow
robustness of the logical level.
Given a sufficiently small number of deletions, ran-
dom deletions tend to have less effect on flow robust-
ness than any other type of deletion. This is unsurpris-
ing, since deletions based on centrality metrics have a
greater tendency to delete more “important” nodes and
links than random deletions. What is surprising, how-
ever, is that, given a sufficient number of deletions, the
flow robustness resulting from non-adaptive deletions
based on closeness and current-flow closeness surpasses
the average flow robustness resulting from random node
deletions. This holds true for all five of the networks
under study. For example in Figure 14b, with 40 ran-
dom node deletions the flow robustness of the Sprint
network is about 0.3, whereas the flow robustness for
closeness is about 0.55. Similarly in Figure 14b, for 60
random node deletions the flow robustness is about 0.1
and for flow closeness the flow robustness is about 0.2.
We speculate that since these are non-adaptive chal-
lenges, by the time network arrives in a state in which
several nodes are deleted, initially calculated rankings
are no longer accurate. However, why this happens only
for closeness and current-flow closeness centrality met-
rics is not known. The reasons for the occurrence of
this phenomenon, and an investigation into the types
of multilevel graphs to which it is restricted, will be the
subject of future work.
6.3 Multiprovider Graph Analysis
We introduce a new graph-theoretic model in which we
define the concept of a multiprovider graph. Within our
framework, a multiprovider graph is an ordered pair
(GL3, GAS), in which L3 represents PoP-level topology
and AS represents the interprovider AS topology, where
GL3 = (VL3, EL3) and GAS = (VAS, EAS) are graphs
such that:
1. the vertices in VAS are mutually disjoint connected
subgraphs ofGL3 that, when taken together, contain
all of the vertices in VL3. More specifically, if
VAS = {v1, v2, ..., vn}, then
(a) any two distinct vertices vi, vj ∈ VAS will be con-
nected subgraphs of GL3 given by vi = (Vi, Ei)
and vj = (Vj , Ej) such that Vi ∩ Vj = Ø
(b) if we let vi = (Vi, Ei) for all integers i such that
1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
⋃n
i=1 Vi = VL3.
2. there exists some function f : EAS → 2EL3 such that
for any pair of distinct vertices vi, vj ∈ VAS given by
vi = (Vi, Ei) and vj = (Vj , Ej), if {vi, vj} ∈ EAS,
then f({vi, vj}) = Vij ∩ EL3 where Vij is the set
of unordered pairs {ui, uj} such that {ui, uj} ∈ Vij
if and only if ui ∈ Vi and uj ∈ Vj . More explic-
itly, the mapping f is used to identify edges be-
tween specific AS peer routers that serve to connect
two ASes vi, vj ∈ VAS that share a given AS-edge
{vi, vj} ∈ EAS.
To study multiprovider graphs, first we combine the
PoP-level topologies of four commercial ISPs (AT&T,
Level 3, Sprint, TeliaSonera). We treat each ISP as a
single AS, and the resulting AS-level abstract graph is
a full-mesh with 4 nodes, in which each AS is connected
to the other through a logical IXP (Internet exchange
point) link. We select Atlanta NAP [1], Equinix [2],
Terremark [7], and MAE-East [5] as the IXPs in which
4 ISPs are connected. The reason we select these 4 IXPs
is that we analysed a number of IXP websites and found
that these IXPs do provide service to the 4 commercial
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ISPs. We do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of
IXPs, however, it was sufficient to generate a full-mesh
AS-level graph for those tier-1 ISP providers. The 4
IXPs are distributed across the US in 17 different cities
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Fig. 22 Flow robustness of multiprovider network
In Figure 22, the flow robustness of a multiprovider
graph is shown. In this case we delete all inter-AS IXP
links in a city, ranked based on betweenness. As ex-
pected, adaptive attacks inflict more harm than non-
adaptive attacks, which, in turn, inflict more harm than
randomly-placed attacks. In Figure 22, the sharp reduc-
tions of flow robustness due to targetted attacks indi-
cate the disconnection of an AS from the AS-level graph
following such attacks. Note that several cities must be
deleted in order to disconnect a single AS. In contrast,
the flow robustness values in random scenarios decrease
at a smoother rate because the flow robustness is av-
eraged over 1000 failure sets. For example, the flow ro-
bustness values indicate that a very high percentage of
the failure sets following the twelfth city deletion did
not partition the network in any manner. Furthermore,
our results indicate that it is very difficult to partition
the tier-1 ISP connectivity, which is a full-mesh, given
that it requires at least 9 cities and all the IXP links in
a city to be destroyed. If we had included all IXPs in
more than 17 cities, intuitively it would have been even
more difficult to partition the AS-level graph.
Next, we analyse flow robustness of two provider
graphs and their connections via IXPs. In this case,
we investigate the flow robustness of provider duos as
shown in Figure 23. Since these graphs are constructed
by only two providers, the impact of random deletions
and centrality-based attacks result in the same flow ro-
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Fig. 24 Resilience of Level 3, Sprint, TeliaSonera trio
breaks when the nth IXP link is broken. For example,
AT&T and Level 3 peer with each other in 16 cities,
and flow robustness remains at 1 until the 16th IXP
link breaks, in which flow robustness drops to 0.
Finally, we analyse the flow robustness of a provider
trio combination (Level 3, Sprint, TeliaSonera). The
network performance when challenged by random fail-
ures and targeted attacks against IXP links are shown
in Figure 24. The number of IXP connections reduced
from 17 to 10 as shown in Figure 24 when we con-
sider only three providers. As expected, the flow ro-
bustness depends on the number of IXP links between
the provider trio.
7 Flow Robustness and Spectral Properties
Previously, we presented how physical communication
topologies match the structure of the right-of-way of
freeways using normalised Laplacian spectra. In this
section, we compare the flow robustness against spec-
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Robustness Rank Rank Rank
Level 3 L3 0.9413 1 0.9758 1 1.5037 1
Sprint L3 0.6503 2 0.6844 3 1.6361 2
TeliaSonera L3 0.5963 3 0.7669 2 1.7237 3
Internet2 L3 0.4779 4 0.4885 4 1.8091 4
AT&T L3 0.2996 5 0.1324 5 1.9127 5
TeliaSonera L1 0.1615 6 0.1178 6 1.9642 6
CORONET L1 0.0958 7 0.0401 7 1.9688 7
Level 3 L1 0.0721 8 0.0261 9 1.9811 9
Internet2 L1 0.0626 9 0.0386 8 1.9858 11
US freeways 0.0323 10 0.0055 10 1.9752 8
AT&T L1 0.0222 11 0.0055 11 1.9892 12
Sprint L1 0.0164 12 0.0053 12 1.9840 10
tral properties of the networks we study. The two im-
portant spectral properties we are interested are alge-
braic connectivity a(G) and the spectral radius ρ(L).
We present these metrics of five logical level topologies,
six physical level network topologies, and US freeway
graph in Table 5.
Flow robustness was defined in the previous section;
here, we calculate its value for single level graphs for
comparison. We approximate the average flow robust-
ness of a given network by averaging the flow robust-
ness over its 10,000 link-failure sets drawn uniformly
and randomly from the pool of all of its link-failure
sets. Next, we consider the algebraic connectivity a(G)
of these topologies. Algebraic connectivity is the sec-
ond smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix and
is well-suited for measuring graph connectivity and for
comparing the connectivities of graphs with the same
order [33]. Finally, we consider the spectral radius of
these 12 topologies. The spectral radius ρ is the ab-
solute value of the maximum eigenvalue, ρ = |λmax|.
Moreover, if ρ(L) = 2, then the graph is bipartite, and
the closer the spectral radii to 2, the closer the graph
is to a bipartite. We calculate the spectral radius of the
normalised Laplacian matrix ρ(L) shown in column 6
of Table 5. We note that we previously studied spectral
radii of Laplacian matrices ρ(L) and adjacency matri-
ces ρ(A), but did not observe any pattern for ρ(L) and
ρ(A) [19].
We rank the flow robustness of networks in descend-
ing order in columns 1 and 2. The logical topologies
have higher values compared to the physical topologies
and the US freeway graph. When we rank the topolo-
gies according to descending values of a(G), we observe
a similar ranking order. In this case, only the rank-
ings of the Internet2 and Level 3 physical topologies are
swapped. Finally, we rank the spectral radii of these 12
topologies in ascending order. The ranking according to
the spectral radii of the first seven topologies matches
the rankings of the flow robustness and a(G). Our con-
clusion from this ranking comparison is that flow ro-
bustness, algebraic connectivity, and spectral radii are
suitable metrics for the resilience analysis of networks.
8 Discussion
In previous sections we presented how communication
and freeway right-of-way graphs relate to each other
as well as an analysis of multilevel communication and
transportation networks. In this section we discuss what
these result mean for the network research community.
Existing models of the Internet often employ a single
level perspective. However, as we demonstrated, multi-
level graphs yield different performance measures than
single level graphs under network perturbations. More-
over, given that the Internet is built on multiple levels
structurally, synthetic topology generators as well as
Internet models should consider its multilevel nature.
Another important factor is the geography of the nodes.
While statistical frameworks provide analytical models
of the Internet, fibre routes are built on the right-of-way
of the freeways, railways, and other critical infrastruc-
tures [59,62]. Moreover, freeways and other critical in-
frastructures are not built randomly or via the preferen-
tial attachment model–instead, they are built between
adjacent major population centers in a way that will
reduce the cost of building these infrastructures [39].
Eventually, this impacts how the fibre routes are laid
out since placing fibre along a freeway is more feasible
than placing it over mountains or other unreachable ter-
rain even if it might result in a shorter physical path.
Another important point of discussion is the differ-
ence in graph-theoretic properties between the physi-
cal and logical topologies. While freeways and physi-
cal fibre route graphs share similar grid-like structural
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characteristics, logical overlays clearly differ from the
physical underlays in terms of well-studied graph met-
rics, spectral properties, and flow robustness values.
Physical topologies have higher distance metric values,
whereas logical topologies have higher centrality met-
ric values. Intuitively, one would expect that a richly-
connected underlay is needed to provide a resilient ser-
vice to users. We have shown that while lower level
graphs have grid-like structure and higher level graphs
have mesh-like structure, the resilient service at the
highest level depends on the protection of critical net-
work elements that are common at all levels.
A third and final point of discussion is that, for a
sufficiently large number of challenges, random failures
can degrade the performance of a network more severely
than non-adaptive attacks targeted at nodes based on
closeness and current-flow closeness centrality metrics.
This is an interesting result and we aim to investigate
the reasons behind it in future work.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Realistically modelling the Internet requires a collective
and systemic analysis of all of its structural properties.
Intuitively, fibre-level topologies are laid along right-of-
way of the freeways, since it is less costly than line-
of-sight installation. We analytically show structural
similarities between these physical infrastructures by
using the normalised Laplacian spectra. Moreover, we
show that synthetically generated Gabriel graphs can
model physical level topologies that are grid-like; how-
ever, with a greater cost incurred. We then show that
geographical physical level graphs are dominated by
degree-2 nodes, and removal of them provides more ac-
curate structural metrics, particularly for degree distri-
bution. Next, using the flow robustness metric we eval-
uated multilevel graphs and analysed combined com-
munication and transport networks with our multilevel
framework. We confirmed that dynamic routing helps
alleviate the impact of perturbations and that adap-
tive challenges degrade multilevel network performance
more than non-adaptive challenges. We also computed
the flow robustness values of single level graphs and our
results indicate that the rankings provided by impor-
tant spectral properties are comparable to the rankings
provided by the flow robustness metric.
Our future work will include the incorporation of
other critical infrastructures such as railways, pipelines,
and the power grid. We will also investigate the signif-
icance of the closeness and current-flow closeness cen-
trality metrics in order to determine why – for a suffi-
cient number of deletions – they have less impact on
the network than random failures. We will evaluate
multi-domain networks including tier-2 and tier-3 net-
works using our multilevel graph framework. Finally, we
will generate graphs with specific properties and adding
links and nodes to increase resilience.
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22. Çetinkaya, E.K., Peck, A.M., Sterbenz, J.P.G.: Flow Ro-
bustness of Multilevel Networks. In: Proceedings of the
9th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on the Design
of Reliable Communication Networks (DRCN), pp. 274–
281. Budapest (2013)
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